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A b stra c t Since its passage, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
has grown to over 8,000 pages of proposed and final rules and regulations. For any bank, compliance
with that volume is a challenge, but for a small bank, it can have far-reaching consequences. This
project analyzes possible effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on financial services providers, specifically
Main Street banks, otherwise known as community banks. In an effort to create a safer and more
stable financial institutional environment, the Dodd-Frank Act added levels of regulation never seen
since the Great Depression. This level of regulation can have negative impacts on community banks in
the form of increased regulatory capital, increased non-interest expense, decreased amount of loans,
and lower returns on equity.
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An Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act
and Its Impact on Community Banks
An Honors Capstone

Introduction
Theories on modern welfare claim that government intervention is necessary to uphold
structure and find economic inefficiencies in markets. These inefficiencies theoretically cause
markets to fail in producing maximum prosperity. Government intervention has tradeoffs but is
believed to ultimately promote the common good and benefit society overall. We see
government intervention in the everyday with federal regulations and its impacts and tradeoffs
have been studied with mixed results (Bivens). Some studies have found that regulation stunts
free market growth and causes negative changes in prices, production, and employment (Bivens).
Other studies have found positive effects of regulation in areas that promote property rights and
contract enforcement (Bivens). This unclear argument can be carried over to the Dodd-Frank
Act.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into federal
law in July of 2010, was enacted to “create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect
consumers, rein in Wall Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and Too Big to Fail, [and] prevent
another financial crisis” (“Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
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Protection Act”). In theory, the Dodd-Frank Act is supposed to lower the risk of a future
Financial Crisis. Any intrinsic costs of additional regulation against banks are presumably offset
by the benefits of a safe and stable financial system. However, the benefits of regulation and
their consequences are not clear. This Capstone project analyzes possible effects of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on financial services providers,
specifically Main Street banks, otherwise known as community banks. The Act is an effort to
create accountability and transparency. However, the Dodd-Frank Act could have negative
consequences on bank operations, bank compliance, bank financials, as well as other aspects for
community banks which are now forced to comply with more extensive regulation than ever
before.

Literary Background
Since its passage, the Dodd-Frank Act has spawned over 8,000 pages of proposed and
final rules and regulations (“ABA Dodd-Frank Tracker”). Managing such a massive amount of
regulation is a challenge for any bank. But for a small bank, it can have far-reaching
consequences. Although much of the Dodd-Frank Act excuses community banks from most
provisions, according to the American Bankers Association, there are still several critical issues
for community banks to consider. These include risk retention, higher capital requirements and
narrower qualifications for capital, and increasing compliance costs (“Cumulative Weight of
New Regulations”). Community banks are now subject to additional registration and oversight
burden by the SEC (“Cumulative Weight of New Regulations”). In combination, this legislation
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could harm smaller banks by imposing higher operating costs to comply with many new rules
and by placing limits on capital (“Cumulative Weight o f New Regulations”).
American Bankers Association Chairman-Elect and an Oklahoma community banker
himself, Albert Kelly addressed Congress in 2011 about the harm Dodd-Frank will have on
community banks. He stated that “The Dodd-Frank Act will raise costs, reduce income and limit
potential growth, all o f which drives capital away from banking, restricts access to credit for
individuals and business, reduces financial resources that create new jobs, and retards growth in
the economy” (Kelly). Kelly forewarned Congress that “the lack o f earnings potential, regulatory
fatigue, lack o f access to capital, limited resources to compete, inability to enhance shareholder
value and return on investment, all push community banks to sell [their banks]” (Kelly).
Acting FDIC Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, who is also concerned about the future o f
community banking, stated to the American Bankers Association in 2011:

W

It is important to recognize that community banks play a critical role not only in the
financial system, but also in the U.S. economy as a whole. While community banks
with assets under $1 billion represent less than 11 percent of banking assets, they
provide nearly 40 percent of the loans the banking industry makes to small
businesses, extending credit that is crucial to job creation. [...] They have a unique
role to play in ourfinancial system.

(“Community Banking Initiatives”)

Different organizations have completed research exploring the effects the Dodd-Frank
Act will have on community banks. Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck’s study in May o f 2012
found that Investment bankers and financial industry consultants estimated Dodd-Frank would
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lower the return on equity o f community banks with less than $500 million in assets to between 6
- 8% (Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). They state that normally, bank investors look for returns
near 11 - 14% (Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). In addition, another study, this one conducted
by the Federal Reserve Bank o f Richmond, estimated that these changes in capital requirements
may limit the pool o f potential investors for raising equity (Powers).
Banks, when creating loans, must now hold on to a higher percentage o f risk for the life
o f the loan than before. Meaning the banks cannot sell or securitize as much o f the loan as
previous to reduce the bank’s own exposure to risk. According to a report conducted by
American Bankers Association, the Tier 1 Minimum Ratios could be raised as high as 9.5%,
which would increase the expense o f those loans to the consumers as banks have to hold higher
levels o f capital in reserve (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks”). Higher regulatory capital

v
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requirements means banks need more equity funding versus debt funding. With equity being
more expensive than debt, this could limit the number o f loans that small community banks can
afford to give out. The report by the ABA stated that “some community banks may stop
providing mortgages altogether as the requirements and compliance costs make such a service
unreasonable without considerable volume” (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks”). Limiting
the number o f loans issued creates a tighter lending climate, a concern Ben Bemanke, the
Chairman o f the Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, addressed last November.
He stated that “overly tight lending standards may now be preventing creditworthy borrowers
from buying homes, thereby slowing the revival in housing and impeding the economic
recovery” (Bemanke).
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The FDIC conducted a report specifically studying how Dodd-Frank affects community
banks. It found that no new community banks have been chartered since 2011 “due in large part
to Dodd-Frank” (“FDIC Community Banking Study”). They also estimate that the U.S. will have
1000 less community banks by 2020, either by banks shutting down because o f compliance costs
or by community banks merging or acquiring each other (“FDIC Community Banking Study”).
A unique section o f the study involves interviews with several presidents o f community banks.
These presidents have stated that banks are increasingly relying on outside consultants and
lawyers, hiring staff to manage the new regulation and are experiencing enormous increases in
their compliance and non-interest costs (“FDIC Community Banking Study”).
Despite the research and claims above, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report in September o f 2012 on the impacts o f Dodd-Frank on community banks
acknowledging that much o f the law’s impact is unknown either because not enough time has
passed or because not enough o f the law is active and ready to use (“Community Banks and
Credit Unions”). Although effects from Dodd-Frank are mostly speculative, the majority o f the
research and opinions address common consequences for community banks which include
greater capital requirements and higher compliance costs.
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Methodology
This project analyzes the effects the Dodd-Frank Act could have on Main Street, or
community banks. As specified by Congress, the difference between a Wall Street bank and a
Main Street bank is based on total assets (“Banking Information and Regulation'’). According to
the Federal Reserve, Table 1 describes the type of bank based on the level of total assets.

T able 1: Bank T ype by Peer G roup and T otal Assets
Type of Bank

Level of Total Assets

Corresponding Peer Group

Systematically Important

$50 billion or greater

Peer Group 1

Large

$10 billion or greater

Peer Group 1

Small, Community

Less than $10 billion

Peer Groups 2, 3, 4, & 5

Source: “Bank Information and Regulation;” FFIEC Website vvvvw.ffiec.gov

In order to obtain large amounts of data from thousands of banks, the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) website is used. It houses the National Information
Center and contains Bank Holding Company Peer Reports. This data divides banks based on
their level of assets, allowing an easy distinction between Systemically Important or Large banks
and Community banks. There are eight peer groups based on total assets. Peer group 1 includes
large and systematically important banks with assets over $10 billion. Peer group 2 has total
assets of $3 billion - $10 billion, Peer group 3 has $1 billion to $3 billion in total assets, Peer
group 4 has $500 million to $1 billion in total assets, and Peer group 5 has less than $500
million. Peer groups 6 and 7 were discontinued, having been combined with other peer groups
over the last decade, and Peer group 9 included atypical banks that had been moved from other
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peer groups. Peer groups 1, 6, 7, and 9 were not included in this report. For this study, we focus
on Peer Groups 2 through 5 for the years 2007 to 2011.
Using the BCH Peer Report documents, various Balance Sheet and Income Statement
items are used to show changes the Dodd-Frank Act may have made on community banks, such
as change in capital and change in non-interest expenses. These items include Net Loan and
Leases, Capital Ratios, Return on Equity, Net Interest Income, and Non-Interest Income, among
a list of others. A summary of the expected effect of Dodd-Frank Act on various items is
presented in Table 2:

Table 2: Sum m ary o f E xpectations For Data
Item

Results

Capital
Non-Interest Expense

Increase
Increase

Loans

Decrease
Decrease

Return on Equity

Results from Data
Capital
One of the concerns for community banks is the amount of capital needed to offset risk is
significantly increasing. The question is, whether small community banks can handle the
increase in regulatory capital; each dollar spent on regulatory capital is one less dollar that can be
spent on additional loans and therefore, possible income from interest. In addition, equity
funding that is needed for these increases in capital is more expensive than debt funding, which

7*

Amy Rivers

is another possible burden community banks will have to try to carry. Table 3 and Graph 1
concentrate on Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital and Total Risk-Based Capital Ratios because they are
specified by the Dodd-Frank Act. Currently, the Dodd-Frank Act requires each bank to have a
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio of 8% and a Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio of 4%. From 2007
to 2011, all peer groups were exceeding these requirements.
T able 3: T ier 1 R isk-Based C apital & T otal R isk-Based C apital by Peer G roup

Peer Group 2

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall

Peer Group 3

Peer Group 4

Tier 1
RBC (%)
10.73
11.15
12.38
13.96
15.22

Total
RBC (%)
12.38
12.94
14.12
15.60
16.74

Tier 1
RBC (%)
10.91
10.67
11.51
12.81
13.89

Total
RBC (%)
12.35
12.20
13.13
14.41
15.43

Tier 1
RBC (%)
11.74
11.17
11.54
12.61
13.65

Total
RBC (%)
13.01
12.57
13.11
14.14
15.20

41.85%

35.22%

27.31%

24.94%

16.27%

16.83%

Peer Group 5
Total
RBC (%)
14.25
13.33
11.80
12.31
12.05
-18.04% -15.44%

Tier 1
RBC (%)
12.86
11.90
10.17
10.69
10.54

A%
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website vvwvv.ffiec.gov

Graph l: Total Risk-Based Capital by Peer Group

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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As expected, when examining the capital ratios above, we see that capital has grown
between the years 2007 and 2011. Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio and Total Risk-Based Capital
Ratio have grown between 41.85% and 35.22% respectively from 2007 to 2011 in Peer 2 with
similar increases in the other Peer groups as well. The only group not following this pattern is
Peer group 5, who actually sees a decrease in capital ratios. Interestingly, as the peer groups
decrease in total assets size, the overall percentage change in the level o f capital also decreases.
Historically, regulation proposals have been lenient on smaller banks allowing them to have less
capital protection among other aspects. The underlying assumption is that smaller banks can fail
without harming the financial market as a whole. Therefore, smaller banks are seen as less risky.
Peer group 5 could be an example o f this exception to the capital requirements. In addition, the
study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank o f Richmond, estimated that changes in capital
requirements may limit the pool o f potential investors for raising equity (Powers). As a result,
this large decrease seen in the smaller banks may be the result o f the tough environment for
raising capital. Lastly, another possible explanation is the number o f problem banks in Peer
group 5. While the number o f banks in each peer has either stayed constant or even grown
between years 2007 and 2011, Peer group 5 is the only peer group to reduce in number o f banks.
In 2007, it contained 101 banks; in 2011, it only contains 80. These problem banks could be
driving capital down.
Graph 1 demonstrates how each bank has met and exceeded the capital requirements
placed by the Dodd-Frank Act; the graphs for Total Risk-Based capital and Tier 1 Risk-Based
capital show identical movements from 2007 to 2011 by the peer groups. The Dodd-Frank
introduced more stringent regulatory capital requirements, causing banks to “bulk up” on equity
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for the safety of the bank and the financial institutional environment. The data above reinforces
the claim by American Bankers Association. In their report, they claim that banks must now hold
on to a higher percentage of risk for the life of the loan than before, meaning the banks cannot
sell or securitize as much of the loan as previous to reduce the bank's own exposure to risk. This
would increase the expense of those loans to the consumers as banks have to hold higher levels
of capital in reserve (“Dodd-Frank and Community Banks"). The capital levels have all risen.

Non-Interest Expense
Compliance costs are causing huge increases to non-interest expense, according to the
interviews of presidents from community banks conducted by FDIC. These increases in NonInterest Expense could be the factor that causes some banks to close or consolidate with other
hurting community banks. Smaller banks might have to hire outside consultants to manage new
regulation, a cost that might not be feasible for them.
Although all peer groups did see an increase in non-interest expense, these increases were
significantly different for each peer group. Looking at Table 4, you will see that between the
years 2007 and 2011, Peer group 2 saw an overall increase of non-interest expense of 0.69%.
Peer group 3, however, saw a much higher increase of about 8%. Peer group 4 increased their
non-interest expense by 1.31% and Peer group 5 saw the largest increase of 9.85%.
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T a b le 4: N o n -In te r e st E x p e n se* by P eer G r o u p

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall A%

Peer Group 2 (%)
2.91
2.96
3.03
2.98
2.93
0.69%

Peer Group 3 (%)
2.88
3.05
3.19
3.01
3.11
7.99%

Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
3.05
3.25
3.07
3.45
3.17
3.48
3.10
3.45
3.09
3.57
1.31%
9.85%
*As a percent of Average Assets

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

Graph 2: Non-Interest Expense* by Peer Group

*as a percent of Average Assets
Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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These large variations between peer groups are hard to explain, even by the FDIC in a
report conducted on this very topic. The FDIC’s report shows that the data available through Call
Reports and other regulatory filings do not provide a breakdown of regulatory versus other types
of noninterest expenses (“FDIC Community Banking Study”). Furthermore, the presidents of
those community banks interviewed discussed that although no one regulation or practice had a
significant effect on their institution, the cumulative effects of regulatory requirements led them
to increase staff over the past ten years. This indicates that overall the claim of massive increases
in non-interest expense is speculative. The data here could simply suggest that the regulation
increase from Dodd-Frank being implemented two years ago, was enough for certain peer groups
to handle. For others, like Peer groups 3 and 5, those banks may have needed increases in staff or
use outside consultants to tackle the challenge of this additional compliance. This especially can
be seen in Peer group 5, which contains the smallest of banks, and is hit the hardest. In this case,
it seems that not enough time has passed since Dodd-Frank was made law to truly see the
changes to Non-Interest expense. The interviews indicated that it would be costly in itself to
collect more detailed information about regulatory costs (“FDIC Community Banking Study”).
Therefore, the data collected here cannot support nor undermine the claim made in the FDIC
Community Banking Study.

Loans
The report by the American Bankers Association stated, as in the previous section, that
higher regulatory capital requirements means banks need more equity funding versus debt
funding. With equity being more expensive than debt, this could limit the number of loans that
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small community banks can afford to make. The report by the ABA even states that “some
community banks may stop providing mortgages altogether as the requirements and compliance
costs make such a service unreasonable without considerable volume” (“Dodd-Frank and
Community Banks”). For this portion, Gross Loans and Leases are studied to find if this
statement could be supported or not.
Table 5 and Graph 3 show that all targeted peer groups saw an overall decrease in Net
Loans and Leases. Each peer group saw a decrease between 25% and 29%, suggesting that the
decrease is unaffected by the size o f total assets. Since each peer group has decreased Net Loans
and Leases, this data reinforces the claim made by the American Bankers Association.
Interestingly, there are common types o f loans that have all significantly decreased for
each targeted peer group. Table 6 reveals the overall percentage change for all types o f loans
from 2007 to 2011 for each peer group. Although other loans have also diminished, the hardest
impacted loans include: Construction and Land Development loans, Loans to Individuals, and
Credit Card loans. Construction and Land Development decreased the most between 2007 and
2011 with an average decrease o f 53.98% across the targeted peer groups; and lastly, Loans to
Individuals decreased 21.65% on average for the peer groups; Lastly, Credit Card loans
decreased an average o f 14.24% across the peer groups. These loans could be the explanation for
the common decrease overall in Gross Loans and Leases for each targeted peer group.

Amy Rivers

T a b le 5: G r o ss L o a n s a n d L ea ses* by P eer G r o u p
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall A%

Peer Group 2 (%)
7.63
6.4
5.66
5.55
5.65
-25.95%

Peer Group 3 (%)
7.82
6.58
5.79
5.79
5.66
-27.62%

Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
7.82
8.01
6.69
6.77
5.87
6.03
5.9
5.88
5.68
5.78
-29.09%
-26.09%
*As a percent of Average Assets

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

T able 6: O verall Percentage C hange o f Loan M ix* from 2007 to 2011 by Peer G roup

Peer Group 2
-0.03%
8.58%
11.78%
8.60%
-2.00%

Peer Group 3
-0.51%
16.13%
34.32%
12.33%
-9.08%

Peer Group 4
1.71%
13.37%
17.32%
11.86%
-5.08%

Peer Group 5
5.42%
1.68%
49.67%
-6.19%
8.99%

Construction and Land Dev

-51.56%

-61.41%

-50.81%

-52.14%

Multifamily
Nonfarm Nonresidential
RE Loans Secured by Farmland
Commercial and Industrial Loans

46.61%
27.16%
42.72%
-2.45%

45.87%
23.68%
38.82%
-0.71%

31.25%
20.31%
29.28%
-8.49%

137.95%
36.58%
2.98%
-16.60%

Loans to Individuals

-10.20%

-19.30%

-21.52%

-35.60%

Credit Card Loans

-12.50%

-16.67%

-11.11%

-16.67%

Agricultural Loans
Other Loans and Leases

28.38%
12.41%

26.97%
5.56%

Real Estate Loans
RE Loans Secured by 1-4 Family
Revolving
Closed-End
Commercial Real Estate Loans

-29.69%
17.52%
17.43%
-26.15%
*As a percent of Gross Loans and Leases

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov
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Graph 3: Gross Loans and Leases* by Peer Group
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Return on Equity
Bone. Reynolds, and Griesbeck claim that banks with less than $500 million in assets
would see Return on Equity decrease to 6-8%, which is well below the normal returns of 11-14%
(Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck). Peer group 5 is the only peer group that has total assets of less
than $500 million; all other peer groups have a higher level of total assets. However, all peer
groups were included in this analysis. Graph 4 illustrates the timeline of ROE from 2007 to 2011
by peer group.
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T a b le 7: R etu rn on E q u ity by P eer G r o u p

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall A%

Peer Group 2 (%)

Peer Group 3 (%)

Peer Group 4 (%)

Peer Group 5 (%)

9.97
-0.36
-2.07
2.75
7.69
-22.78%

3.76
0.54
-1.34
0.76
2.14
-43.14%

2.55
0.83
-0.37
0.62
1.25
-50.96%

9.26
-1.13
-21.28
-6.02
-5.59
-160.37%

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

Graph 4: Return on Equity by Peer Group
15.00
10.00
5-oo
^ 0.00
c
2 -5.00
o
^ -10.00
-15.00
-

2 0 .0 0

-25.00
■ Peer Group 2

■ Peer Group 3

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

■ Peer Group 4

■ Peer Group 5

Amy Rivers

In 2007, community banks were in an acceptable state for ROE. In 2008, their ROE
dropped significantly, no doubt from the financial crisis and also from low, and in some cases,
negative Net Incomes. In 2009, they continue to see decreases in ROE, although community
banks, those with less than $500 million in assets, suffer the most. Out o f all the Peer groups,
Peer group 5’s Net Income is the lowest and cannot handle the pressures from the financial
crisis. Table 7 shows Peer group 5 with an ROE level o f -21.28% in 2009. 2010 and 2011
represent recovery years. This table shows how Peer groups 2, 3, and 4 are back to seeing
positive Returns on Equity. The smallest o f the community banks, however, are still seeing
negative ROEs. Recall that Table 3 showed Peer group 5 was experiencing declining capital
ratios. For ROE to decrease, Net Income would have had to be negative.
It’s important to note here the flaws associated with Return on Equity. First, there are
issues with measuring Return on Equity because o f the different equations one could use when
determining ROE. In this case, the standard Net Income divided by Shareholder’s Equity was
used. It is unclear the formula used in the study conducted by Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck.
One example variation could include using average shareholder’s equity versus end-of-theperiod shareholder’s equity. Other issues include certain cases where, for example, the bank
carries a larger amount debt in comparison to equity. If this bank chooses to raise funds through
borrowing, rather than issuing stock, it will reduce its book value. This lower book value means
a falsely higher ROE because you’re dividing by a smaller number. Another instance could
include stock buy backs; this also could produce a higher ROE without any improvement in the
bank’s profits. Most advise to use other ratios besides ROE to get a full picture. To expand on
this analysis, ROA was also calculated. The results are seen Table 8.
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In this case, ROA for each targeted Peer group matches the results from ROE, although
the decreases in ROA are smaller than seen in ROE. With ROA and ROE nearly matching, the
results from ROE are accredited.

T a b le 8: R etu rn on A sse ts by P eer G r o u p

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall A%

Peer Group 2 (%)
0.92%
-0.03%
-0.20%
0.28%
0.85%
-7.07%

Peer Group 3 (%)
0.33%
0.04%
-0.11%
0.07%
0.20%
-37.23%

Peer Group 4 (%)
0.22%
0.07%
-0.03%
0.05%
0.12%
-48.56%

Peer Group 5 (%)
0.83%
-0.09%
-1.45%
-0.42%
-0.39%
-146.59%

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

It’s possible that this data reinforces the claim by Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck that the
Dodd-Frank Act would significantly harm ROE for the smallest of community banks. In Table
7, Return on Equity by Peer Group, you can see the overall changes in ROE from 2007 to 2011.
It’s true that as the banks reduce in size, based on their total assets, the reduction in ROE
increases. Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck estimated ROE levels would decrease to 6-8%, but
certainly not into the negatives. One possible explanation for this significant decrease is Net
Income for each targeted peer group also significantly decreased, affecting the ROE formula.
The overall percentage change of Net Income for each targeted Peer group is shown in Table 9.
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T able 9: Net Incom e* by Peer G roup
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Overall A%

Peer Group 2 (%)
0.87
-0.03
-0.18
0.25
0.8
-8.05%

Peer Group 3 (%)
0.89
0.13
-0.33
0.2
0.62
-30.34%

Peer Group 4 (%) Peer Group 5 (%)
0.91
0.84
0.28
-0.08
-0.13
-1.35
0.23
-0.38
0.52
-0.31
-42.86%
-136.90%
*As a percent of Average Assets

Source: BHC Peer Reports, FFIEC Website www.ffiec.gov

Peer group 2 had a reduction in Net Income from 2007 to 2011 of 8.05%; Peer group 3
had a decrease of 30.34%; Peer group 4 decreased by 42.86%; and Peer group 5 was impacted
the hardest with a decrease of 136.90% from 2007 to 2011. Not surprisingly, the smaller the
bank in terms of total assets, the larger reduction in their Net Income. The prediction made by
Bone, Reynolds, and Griesbeck of the reduction in ROEs appears supported. However, their
prediction of the extent of damage cannot. This might imply that the damage is more from the
financial crisis than from the Dodd-Frank Act.

Current State of the Dodd-Frank Act
The government decided that the cost of additional regulation for the banks is justified by
the benefits of a safe and stable financial system. Even if the cost of additional regulation is
passed onto them, consumers would probably agree with the Government. Consumers know they
would suffer far greater with another financial crisis than to pay a few additional charges every
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month for their checking account. However, this can only be successfully argued if the additional
regulation was, indeed, encouraging a safer and more stable financial system.
With Dodd-Frank only two and a half years old, it is still uncertain what the long term
benefits and consequences will be. According to data compiled by the law firm Davis Polk,
regulators are currently only about 37 percent finished with the rulemaking involved with DoddFrank (“Dodd-Frank Progress Report”). Former FDIC chief Sheila Bair and Lloyd Blankfein, the
chief executive o f Goldman Sachs, recognize how slow the progress o f Dodd-Frank has been.
Bair stated that the reforms are “drowning in a sea o f complexity” and added that “regulators
charged with carrying out the rules aren't doing their job in a muscular enough way” (Liberto).
Blankfein agreed: “A lot o f Dodd-Frank, as a bill, was skeletal and a lot o f the very, very
important details were left to the regulatory process” (Liberto). Blankfein also added that “the
regulators themselves are having problems coming to the right conclusions and filing those in”
(Liberto).
This growing complexity is costly. Major deadlines have been missed, slowing the
progress even further and forcing some to truly question whether Dodd-Frank is really the
solution it set out to be. According to the monthly report conducted by Davis Polk that came out
April 1st, 2013:

A total o f279 Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirement deadlines have passed.
• Of these 279passed deadlines, 176 (63.1%) have been missed and 103
(36.9%) have been met with finalized rules.
• In addition, 148 (37.2%) of the 398 total required rulemakings have been
finalized, while 129 (32.4%) rulemaking requirements have not yet been
proposed.
•

(“Dodd-Frank Progress Report”)
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Conclusion
In theory, the Dodd-Frank Act gives us financial stability with the costs of additional
regulation. In practice, however, further research is needed to determine if Dodd-Frank is
completing what it set out to do and to see what effects it will have on community banks. At only
two and a half years old, Dodd-Frank is still in its infancy. In terms of available data, that leaves
us with only two years, truly not enough to set trends. In the trends we do see, it’s not always
possible to separate what is being caused by Dodd-Frank and what is being caused by effects felt
from the Financial Crisis. As we watch it unfold and analyze the impacts of this regulation fully,
it becomes obvious further research is required to see the long term consequences and benefits of
Dodd-Frank, especially on community banks, as to whether it created that safe and stable
financial system as promised.
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